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RESTRAINTS ON WORKERS’ WAGES AND MOBILITY: 
NO-POACH AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTITRUST 
LAWS 
Donald J. Polden* 
A decade ago, the United States Justice Department’s Antitrust Division 
filed an antitrust complaint against several major Silicon Valley tech 
companies for their longstanding secret agreements to not “poach” or 
hire-away each other’s’ employees, notably engineers and animators.  
The companies quickly settled the case, but it served to focus great na-
tional attention on the prevalent use of various restraints on worker mo-
bility and compensation by use of agreements among competitors.  This 
Article examines the impact on the Silicon Valley no-poach conspiracies 
on workers and the growing recognition that restraints on workers can 
constitute violations of federal and state antitrust laws.  The Article also 
describes the recent and aggressive enforcement efforts of the Antitrust 
Division through strong policy statements, submissions of “letters of in-
terest” in private party litigation involving no-poach agreements in sev-
eral other industries, and its own criminal and civil antitrust enforce-
ment.  However, the Article also argues that private and government 
enforcement efforts could be even stronger if, the courts established the 
applicability of the rule of per se illegality, or the “quick look” ap-
proach, to many of these agreements.  The Article also argues that there 
needs to be great scrutiny of related restrictive agreements imposed on 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2010, the United States Justice Department’s Anti-
trust Division filed an antitrust complaint against several major technol-
ogy companies for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.1  The 
complaint culminated the Department’s investigation into a long-stand-
ing set of agreements between the Silicon Valley companies that began 
about 2005 and continued unabated until the Justice Department filed 
suit in 2010.2  The Department’s investigation showed that the informal 
agreements were entered into by the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of 
leading technology companies and, in those agreements, the CEOs 
 
 1. See generally Complaint, United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629 
(D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2010) (No. 1). 
 2. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Six High Tech 
Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements: Settle-
ment Preserves Competition for High Tech Employees (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-high-tech-companies-stop-entering-anticom-
petitive-employee [hereinafter High-Tech Co. Press Release]. 
2020] NO-POACH AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 581 
pledged to each other that they would not “poach” employees from each 
other.3  Initially forged by legendary tech and entertainment company 
CEOs George Lucas and Steve Jobs, the agreements were often verbal, 
although they were followed by email communications to shore up the 
details of the agreements and, in some instances, to enforce compliance 
with the agreements.4  The agreements were adhered to by the CEOs 
(and often the heads of human resources office) and their adherence to, 
and compliance with, the agreements exerted devastating effects on the 
career earning power of thousands of technology engineers and anima-
tion engineers and artists.5  The simplicity of the agreements added to 
their effectiveness in gaining and maintaining agreement by the CEOs 
and they resulted in blunt impacts on their targets—company employ-
ees.6 
When the anticompetitive agreements were discovered, and a gov-
ernment enforcement action was initiated against the conspiring CEOs’ 
companies, many in the Silicon Valley business community were per-
plexed as to why these business leaders would implement agreements 
that had, as their only purpose, the suppression of wages and job mobility 
for their own employees.  Why would corporate executives, schooled as 
they all are in antitrust compliance programs and government enforce-
ment concerns, feel comfortable entering into these agreements?  Why 
would they believe that their companies’ best interests were antithetical 
to the interests of their employees?  Why would they put the interests of 
profitability and shareholders return above that of their own employees?  
Those questions—which, frankly, were not completely answered or ad-
dressed in either the ensuing federal government cases or the private lit-
igation brought by injured employees—will be discussed in this article 
as will the broader policy implications involved in application of the fed-
eral antitrust laws to markets for labor and employment.  Importantly, 
the Silicon Valley no-poach conspiracies spawned considerable reflec-
tion of the failings of the federal antitrust laws to enforce current laws 
against collusive and anti-competitive activities in employment and 
 
 3. For purposes of the complaint and the subsequent consent decree final judgment, the 
tech companies’ illegal conduct included agreed-to restraints “from soliciting, cold calling, 
recruiting, or otherwise competing for employees” of the other conspirators. Final Judgment, 
United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. 2011), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/atr/case-document/final-judgment-0. 
 4. In re Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 20, 2015). 
 5. Nitsch v. Dreamworks Animation SKG Inc., 315 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 
2016). 
 6. Ted Johnson, Studios Hit with New Class-Action Suit over Anti-Poaching Pacts, 
VARIETY (Sept. 8, 2014), https://variety.com/2014/biz/news/disney-dreamworks-aninmation-
lawsuit-1201300974/. 
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labor markets and signaled the beginning of an era of great governmental 
protection of workers from anti-competitive conduct in those markets.   
In the aftermath of the private and government actions against the 
tech giants and their conspiring CEOs, the country has seen an increased 
focus by state and federal antitrust enforcers against anticompetitive re-
straints in labor and employment markets.7  This article will consider 
some of the challenges to enforcement of federal antitrust laws in those 
markets, including the economic problem of monopsony and the diffi-
culty of ensuring antitrust enforcement in buyer’s markets, and then will 
consider some of the normative implications of using antitrust law to 
address restrictive practices in markets for employment and labor.  The 
central theme of the article is that the government’s enforcement of the 
antitrust laws in the Silicon Valley no-poach cases has led to enforce-
ment initiatives in markets for labor and employment and has sparked 
greater academic and private enforcement efforts in those markets.  This 
is a positive development because enforcement of antitrust law in these 
markets has been neglected and the growing national concern about lim-
its on worker mobility, wages, and economic prosperity requires greater 
attention, perhaps even by federal competition law and policy.   
This article begins with a factual and historical examination of the 
no-poach agreements used by tech companies in Silicon Valley.  This 
background section also discusses the growing use of anticompetitive 
agreements in employment or labor markets by major firms and indus-
tries and begins an evaluation of the positions taken by the courts and by 
government agencies (mainly the Federal Trade Commission, the Justice 
Department’s Antitrust Division and state attorney generals) in response 
to growing national concerns about economic conditions in labor mar-
kets.  The following sections examine how government agencies and 
courts in private antitrust litigation have recently been applying antitrust 
laws to labor markets including applying current antitrust analysis to no-
poach and other explicit restrictions on workers’ mobility.  In particular, 
this article uses the Justice Department Antitrust Division’s statements 
of interest in several current no-poach cases as a door to looking more 
broadly at antitrust analysis in labor markets.  The final section argues 
that labor markets have been neglected by antitrust enforcement, due in 
large part to economic and conceptual difficulties in approaching com-
petition issues in labor markets and to limitations on the ability of current 
antitrust laws to address those market problems.  Concluding, this article 
 
 7. See Michael Murray, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Presentation at the Santa Clara University Law Review Symposium: Antitrust Enforce-
ment in Labor Markets: The Department of Justice’s Effort 7-8 (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1142111/download [hereinafter Murray, Justice’s 
Efforts]. 
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argues that perhaps the Steve Jobs and George Lucas led conspiracies to 
restrain their workers futures were cathartic to antitrust enforcers and 
have fostered much greater recognition of competition problems in labor 
markets and the need for special antitrust treatment in those markets.   
II. THE SILICON VALLEY NO POACH AGREEMENTS AND RESTRAINTS 
OF TRADE IN EMPLOYMENT 
The history of Section 1 of the Sherman Act includes some of the 
most audacious conspiracies among competitors to restrain trade by fix-
ing prices or restraining competition through anticompetitive conduct 
such as boycotting competitors, allocating territories, or rigging market 
prices.  The infamous “phase of the moon” bid-rigging conspiracy by the 
four firms manufacturing electricity generating equipment set a new 
standard for corporate collusion inspired by greed.  It resulted in several 
executives of the four major corporate defendants being convicted of 
criminal violations of the Sherman Act.8  The Silicon Valley no-poach 
agreement conspiracies were as effective in stifling competitive condi-
tions as the electrical equipment conspiracy cases of the 1950s, although 
none of the tech company CEOs went to prison.9  This section of the 
article identifies the harms suffered by Silicon Valley workers and cor-
porations because of the antitrust conspiracies from the Silicon Valley 
no-poach agreements and then describes significant actions taken by 
government antitrust enforcement agencies in the wake of the conspira-
cies. 
A. An Overview of the Silicon Valley Agreements 
In the early 2000s, Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple, Inc., began to resent 
the effects on the company’s innovative consumer product projects 
caused by employee—mainly project engineers— turnover.10  The Val-
ley was jumping with new startup firms seeking the next great computer 
or software innovation and the economic vibrancy was fueled by 
 
 8. See Myron W. Watkins, Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases—Their Implications 
for Government and for Business, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 101 n.8 (1961). 
 9. High-Tech Co. Press Release, supra note 2; Final Judgment at 4, United States v. 
Adobe Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011) (prohibiting defendants en-
forcing any agreement not to compete for employees of another). 
 10. See When Rules Don’t Apply, FILMMAKERS COLLABORATIVE SF, 
https://www.whenrulesdontapply.com/; Levi Sumagaysay, “When Rules Don’t Apply”: Did 
Silicon Valley Tech Giants Learn from No-Poaching Antitrust Cases?, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS (May 24, 2019), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/05/24/when-rules-dont-apply-
did-silicon-valley-tech-giants-learn-from-no-poaching-antitrust-case/; Mark Ames, The 
Techtopus: How Silicon Valley’s Most Celebrated CEOs Conspired to Drive Down 100,000 
Tech Engineers’ Wages, PANDO (Jan. 23, 2014), https://pando.com/2014/01/23/the-tech-
topus-how-silicon-valleys-most-celebrated-ceos-conspired-to-drive-down-100000-tech-en-
gineers-wages/. 
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engineers (mainly computer and electrical) who were managing new 
product design and development for the latest technology devices and 
products.11  The demand for their talent catapulted salaries.12  The ex-
panding technical needs from historically less technical industries, such 
as animation and music, further enhanced the demand for project man-
agers, research and development and other engineering talent.13  Jobs’ 
response to the challenges of keeping key talent within the company was 
to ask other Silicon Valley technology companies’ CEOs, many of 
whom served on Apple’s Board of Directors, to refrain from hiring Ap-
ple’s engineers and, in exchange, Jobs promised that Apple would not 
hire their talent.14  Apparently, George Lucas of Lucasfilm suggested 
these agreements to Jobs because Lucas had previously implemented 
similar arrangements with respect to animator artists and engineers at 
several major animation production companies.15  The alleged Silicon 
Valley conspiracy involved agreements between or among companies 
under the control of Steve Jobs and/or a company that shared at least one 
director with Apple’s Board of Directors.16 
The agreements between these tech industry firms took two forms: 
(1) an anti-solicitation scheme in which the conspirators agreed not to 
solicit each other’s engineer employees, mainly by refraining from “cold 
calling” prospective employees at other conspirators’ companies and (2) 
agreements to compensation ranges for classes of professional employ-
ees.17  The agreements between the companies lasted from 2005 to 2009 
and they were all similar in their purpose to suppress the compensation 
and job mobility of the technical, creative, and selected other salaried 
employees.18  The initial group of Silicon Valley companies investigated 
by the Department of Justice were Adobe Systems, Inc., Apple, Inc., 
Google, Inc., Intel Corporation, Intuit, Inc., and Pixar.19  The group of 
 
 11. FILMMAKERS COLLABORATIVE SF, supra note 10; Sumagaysay, supra note 10; 
Ames, supra note 10. 
 12. FILMMAKERS COLLABORATIVE SF, supra note 10; Sumagaysay, supra note 10; 
Ames, supra note 10. 
 13. FILMMAKERS COLLABORATIVE SF, supra note 10; Sumagaysay, supra note 10; 
Ames, supra note 10. 
 14. See Animation Workers, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 1199-1204; Dreamworks, 315 F.R.D. at 
277, 289-92; see also Ames, supra note 10. 
 15. It appears from the pleadings in the In re Animation Workers Antitrust Litig. cases 
that “ ‘ the roots of the conspiracy reach back to the mid-1980s,’ when George Lucas, the 
former Lucasfilm Chairman of the Board and CEO, sold Lucasfilm’s ‘computer division’ to 
Steve Jobs, who had recently left Apple.” Animation Workers, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1201. 
 16. In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 17. See Animation Workers, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1200-04; High-Tech Emp., 985 F. Supp. 
2d at 1172-73. 
 18. See High-Tech Emp., 985 F. Supp. 2d at 1172. 
 19. Id. at 1200. 
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corporate defendants later enlarged to include eBay and international 
tech giants.20   
Upon learning of the agreements, the Justice Department’s Anti-
trust Division (the “Department”) began an investigation in 2009 that 
ultimately spawned civil antitrust actions against six companies in the 
computer and animation industries.21  The defendants quickly entered 
into settlement agreements.22  Each of these agreements included a con-
sent decree and final judgment wherein defendants did not admit any 
violations of law and further specified that the judgment would not have 
a conclusive effect in any subsequent private actions.23  The consent de-
cree was beneficial to the companies but it made it more difficult for the 
plaintiffs, such as engineers, who were harmed by the conspiracy to 
prove their case of conspiracy to suppress competition in worker salaries 
and mobility.24   
The Department’s civil action was followed by several private class 
action law suits filed by current and former computer and animation en-
gineers, creative animators, and other skilled employees of the defendant 
companies.25  In addition, the State of California brought an action 
against some of the defendants under the state antitrust and unfair com-
petition laws and in its parens patriae relationship to the citizen-employ-
ees of those corporate defendants.26 
The state and federal court lawsuits were just the beginning of the 
legal problems facing the major tech firms that participated in the no-
 
 20. See Dreamworks, 315 F.R.D. at 275-76. 
 21. Final Judgment at 1, 5, United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629 
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2011) (suit against Adobe Systems, Inc., Apple, Inc., Google Inc., Intel Cor-
poration; Intuit, Inc. and Pixar). See Animation Workers, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1200.   
 22. See also High-Tech Co. Press Release, supra note 2; see also Animation Workers, 87 
F. Supp. 3d at 1200; Dreamworks, 315 F.R.D. at 275. 
 23. Final Judgment at 1, U.S. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. Mar. 
18, 2011); Competitive Impact Statement at 15, U.S. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-
01629 (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/483431/download.   
 24. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act permits a final consent judgment or decree entered 
in a suit brought by the U.S. Government to be used as prima facie evidence of the violation 
in a subsequent suit. 15 U.S.C.§16(a) (2012). The section also states that the prima facie rules 
do not apply if the consent judgement or decree was entered before testimony was taken, thus 
encouraging settlement of the government’s case at an early stage. Id.   
 25. See generally Animation Workers, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1195; High-Tech Emp., 985 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1167. 
 26. The State of California brought actions on behalf of citizens injured by anticompeti-
tive conduct of eBay and Intuit, Inc. and ultimately entered into settlements with both compa-
nies. See generally Second Amended Complaint, State of California v. eBay, No. CV12-5874-
EJD-PSG (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (No. 32), http://www.agtechemploymentsettle-
ment.com/media/227074/ca_doj_second_amended_complaint.pdf; Settlement Agreement, 
State of California v. eBay, No. CV12-5874-EJD-PSG (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2014) (No. 55-4), 
http://www.agtechemploymentsettlement.com/media/227062/settlement_agreement.pdf. 
Such parens patriae suits by state governments are permitted by 15 U.S.C. §15(c)(a)(1) 
(2012).   
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poach agreements.  The government’s litigation, which was quickly set-
tled by the companies, gave way to multiple class action lawsuits 
brought by the tech and animation workers who were the victims of the 
no-poach agreements.27  Current and former employees of other technol-
ogy and animation companies joined the class action lawsuits claiming 
they had been injured by wage suppression, artificially fixed salaries, 
and suppression of job mobility that resulted in artificial constraints on 
their lifetime earning potential.28   
The private class action lawsuits brought on behalf of more than 
64,000 engineers, animators and other adversely affected professional 
employees of defendants were settled, as was the State of California 
parens patriae suit brought on behalf of 31,000 Silicon Valley workers, 
with millions of dollars paid by defendants.29  The sufficiency of the set-
tlement amounts was fiercely contested by the district court, which ini-
tially refused to approve the settlement until defendants and plaintiffs 
agreed to a higher settlement amount.30 
The impact of the Silicon Valley no-poach agreements and the liti-
gation that followed did not end with the consent decrees and the pay-
ment of class action settlement amounts.  The Obama Administration’s 
Justice Department, together with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
decided that greater enforcement of antitrust laws was necessary in mar-
kets for talent and employees; and that began with a joint Antitrust Guid-
ance memorandum for enforcement of those laws in markets for employ-
ees.31 
B. DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidance for Human Resources Professionals 
In October 2016, the FTC and U.S. Department of Justice’s Anti-
trust Division jointly published “Antitrust Guidance for Human Re-
source Professionals” (the “Antitrust Guidance”) with the stated inten-
tion of providing guidance to corporations and other entities on the 
applicability of the antitrust laws to human resource and employment 
 
 27. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires eBay to End An-
ticompetitive “No Poach” Hiring Agreements (May 1, 2014), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-ebay-end-anticompetitive-no-poach-hiring-
agreements. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See generally High-Tech Emp., 985 F. Supp. 2d at 1167. See generally Order Grant-
ing Motion For Final Approval of Settlement, State of California v. eBay, No. 5:12-cv-05874-
EJD (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2015) (No. 85). 
 30. Daniel J. McCoy & Saundra L. M. Riley, Fenwick Employment Brief, FENWICK & 
WEST LLP 3 (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/EB-03-25-
15.pdf. 
 31. See generally Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV. AND FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 2016), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/atr/file/903511/download [hereinafter Antitrust Guidance]. 
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practices.32  Nominally, the publication of the joint statement was in-
tended to provide guidance to human resources professionals, but it also 
served as a major pronouncement of government antitrust enforcement 
initiatives in markets for talent and labor and is notable for more reasons 
than guidance to employers.  First, it addressed some of the uncertainty 
manifested by the Justice Department’s apparent hesitation to move 
against the Silicon Valley no-poach agreements criminally, rather than 
the civil litigation approach it took.33  According to one former DOJ law-
yer involved in the no-poach civil cases, there was some uncertainty 
about whether traditional antitrust doctrines were applicable in labor 
markets.34  The Antitrust Guidance, however, makes it clear that the fed-
eral antitrust laws are fully applicable to all employers and for the pro-
tection of workers.35  Second, the Antitrust Guidance specifies that some 
anticompetitive practices taken to stifle competition in employment mar-
kets would be prosecuted by the Department criminally and that the gov-
ernment may seek to invoke the per se rule in labor antitrust cases in-
volving “naked restraints on worker wages.36  In particular, the Antitrust 
Guidance states that “[g]oing forward, the Department intends to pro-
ceed criminally against naked wage-fixing or no-poaching agree-
ments.”37   
By this time, the administration in Washington D.C. had changed 
and the new leadership of the Antitrust Division and new membership 
of the FTC announced that they would continue vigorous enforcement 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act in markets for employment.38  
 
 32. Antitrust Guidance, supra note 31, at 1. 
 33. Id. at 2-4. 
 34. Statement of Gene Kimmelman, former Chief Counsel for Competition Policy, U.S. 
Department of Justice, in WHEN RULES DON’T APPLY, https://www.whenrulesdontap-
ply.com/ (stating that the government’s case against the tech companies was the first to apply 
the antitrust laws to labor markets). However, in a subsequent statement, a leading DOJ An-
titrust Division lawyer said, “[t]he historical relationship between antitrust law and labor mar-
kets is long and complicated.” Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 6. Without a doubt, 
there has been a record of government enforcement of the antitrust laws in the context of labor 
and employment markets. See, e.g., Anderson v. Shipowners’ Ass’n of Pacific Coast, 272 U.S. 
359, 364-65 (1926) (holding that antitrust laws applies to wage-fixing conspiracies). But they 
have been infrequently applied to these markets and for a variety of reasons, some of which 
are discussed in a later section of the Article. See generally Ioana Marinescu & Eric Posner, 
Why Has Antitrust Law Failed Workers? (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3335174. 
 35. Antitrust Guidance, supra note 31, at 3-4. 
 36. Id. at 3. 
 37. Id. at 4. Further, the guidelines state that “[t]hese types of agreements eliminate com-
petition in the same irredeemable way as agreements to fix product prices or allocate cus-
tomer, which have traditionally been criminally investigated and prosecuted as hardcore cartel 
conduct.” Id. 
 38. See No More No-Poach: The Antitrust Division Continues to Investigate and Prose-
cute ‘No Poach’ and Wage Fixing Agreements, ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-
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Following these agency announcements, the Antitrust Division has used 
its enforcement powers to bring cases against firms that utilize no-poach, 
no-hire, and related restraints on worker mobility and pay.39  The follow-
ing section describes these efforts and raises some important questions 
about government enforcement policies in cases involving no-poach or 
other labor-related restraints.   
C. The Antitrust Division Efforts to Enforce Antitrust Guidance 
Since the agencies’ Antitrust Guidance was published, the Antitrust 
Division has taken an active enforcement position with respect to re-
straints on hiring, salary, and employment mobility.40  Since the Anti-
trust Division announced its effort to prosecute employment-related re-
straints of trade, there have been several major developments related to 
its efforts to enforce the policy articulated in the Antitrust Guidance for 
HR Professionals. 
First, the Antitrust Division has brought civil and criminal actions 
against companies imposing the restraints on their workers.  The Justice 
Department reiterated that it would prosecute “naked” no-poach agree-
ments criminally for “agreements that began after the date of that an-
nouncement, or that began before but continued after that announce-
ment.”41  For example, the government brought Section 1, Sherman Act 
actions against Knorr-Bremse AG and Westinghouse Air Brake Com-
pany, major firms in the railroad equipment suppliers industry, for en-
tering into agreements not to hire or solicit each other’s employees.42  
The defendants settled the cases with the government and are defending 
class action lawsuits brought by employees who were the objects of the 




 39. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No-Poach Approach: Division Update 
Spring 2019 (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-up-
date-spring-2019/no-poach-approach [hereinafter No-Poach Press Release]. 
 40. See, e.g., Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 4-5; see also No-Poach Press 
Release, supra note 39. 
 41. Andrew C. Finch, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Remarks at the Heritage Foundation (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-andrew-c-finch-delivers-re-
marks-heritage.   
 42. See generally Complaint, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG and Westinghouse Air 
Brakes Technologies Corp., No. 1:18-cv-00747 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2018) (No. 1), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1048866/download. 
 43. See generally Final Judgment, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG and Westinghouse 
Air Brakes Technologies Corp., No. 1:18-cv-00747 (D.D.C. July 11, 2018) (No. 19), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1084651/download. For information on the 
private actions against the railway equipment conspirators, see generally In re Ry. Indus. Emp. 
No-Poach Antitrust Litig., 2019 WL 2542241 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 2019). 
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Second, the Antitrust Division has used its “Statements of Interest” 
practice to intervene in private litigation involving no-poach agreements 
and to influence and inform the federal district judges considering the 
antitrust significance of no-poach agreements.  One of the key steps that 
the Department has taken in recent years since the tech industries’ no-
poach conspiracies is through the amicus program, by which the Depart-
ment files statements of interest in private antitrust actions in federal 
courts.44  The amicus program is a priority of the new Justice Department 
Antitrust Division administration as a method of signaling the Depart-
ment’s enforcement priorities.45  One of the key areas of interest for the 
Department has been cases where competitive conditions in markets for 
talent, employment, and jobs have been allegedly harmed by conduct 
that arguably violates federal antitrust laws.46  Several cases have in-
volved private actions against parties for allegedly anticompetitive re-
strictions on employment through use of wage suppression agreements 
(such as no-hire or no-poach agreements) and job mobility restrictions.47   
The following sections briefly describe some of the recent State-
ments of Interest filed in federal district courts by the Antitrust Division 
in cases involving no-poach agreements and are intended to explicate the 
Department’s rationale in applying current antitrust law to no-poach 
agreements. 
 
 44. The Department of Justice has authority to submit statements in interest pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §517, which permits the Attorney General to attend to the interests of the United 
States in any case pending in a federal court. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United 
States at 1, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., Civil No. 2:18-MC-00798-JFC 
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019). 
 45. Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
115th Cong. 29 (2018) (statement of the Hon. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Anti-
trust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). Some history on the use of amicus curiae filing in private 
antitrust litigation can be found in Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 1-4. 
 46. See No-Poach Press Release, supra note 39 (“[T]he Division protects labor markets 
and employees by actively investigating and challenging unlawful no-poach and wage-fixing 
agreements between employers. When companies agree not to hire or recruit one another’s 
employees, they are agreeing not to compete for those employees’ labor. Robbing employees 
of labor market competition deprives them of job opportunities, information, and the ability 
to use competing offers to negotiate better terms of employment. Under the antitrust laws, the 
same rules apply when employers compete for talent in labor markets as when they compete 
to sell goods and services.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Seaman v. Duke 
Univ., C.A. No. 1:15-cv00462-CCE-JLW (M.D. N.C. Mar. 7, 2019); Corrected Statement of 
Interest of the United States of America, Joseph Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc, No. 2:18-cv-
00244-SAB (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2019); Statement of Interest of the United States, In re Ry. 
Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., No. 2:18-mc-00798-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019) (No. 
158). 
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1. In re Railway Industry Employee No-Poach Antitrust Litigation 
In In re Railway Industry Employee No-Poach Antitrust Litigation, 
plaintiffs alleged that there were agreements between two direct compet-
itors, Knorr Bremse AG and Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Cor-
poration (Wabtec), and their subsidiaries to “refrain from soliciting or 
hiring each other’s employees without the consent of the current em-
ployer,” which were termed “no-poach agreements.”48  The Department 
intervened and filed a Statement of Interest arguing that the rule of per 
se illegality should be applied by the court because of a horizontal mar-
ket division arrangement. The Department argued to the District Court 
that:   
Courts have long held that customer- and market-allocation agree-
ments among competitors are per se unlawful. No-poach agreements 
among competing employers are a type of allocation agreement af-
fecting a labor market. As with other allocation agreements, they are 
per se unlawful unless the facts show that they are reasonably nec-
essary to a separate, legitimate business transaction or collaboration 
among the employers.49 
The Department’s Statement cited multiple decisions in which 
courts have denied defendants’ motions to dismiss claims of per se ille-
gal conduct holding that the challenged no-poach agreements would be 
subject to the per se rule if the evidence demonstrated a “naked” price 
fixing agreement.50  In all those cases, which were ultimately settled 
prior to trial, the courts held that the per se rule would be applied because 
the no-poach agreements should be characterized as conduct that was 
presumptively illegal.51  Because those cases settled before final adjudi-
cation, it is accurate to state that the rule of per se illegality has yet to be 
applied to a no-poach agreement.52 
2. Seaman v. Duke University, et al.53 
Plaintiff-university faculty members in Seaman v. Duke University, 
et al. alleged that the medical school deans of Duke University and the 
University of North Carolina conspired to suppress the wages of medical 
school professors by agreeing to a “no-poach agreement” under which 
 
 48. Statement of Interest of the United States, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust 
Litig., No. 2:18-mc-00798-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019) (No. 158). 
 49. Id. at 1-2. 
 50. Id. at 8-9. 
 51. Boris Bershteyn et al., DOJ Wades Deeper Into No-Poach Advocacy, SKADDEN, 
ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.skadden.com/in-
sights/publications/2019/03/doj-wades-deeper. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Seaman v. Duke Univ., C.A. No. 1:15-cv00462-CCE-JLW (M.D. N.C.). 
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“they would not hire each other’s faculty in a lateral move [unless] there 
is an upward move, ie [sic] a promotion.”54 
The Department intervened in the private class action suit and filed 
a Statement of Interest arguing that the per se rule should apply to the 
alleged no-poach agreement unless Duke proved that it was reasonably 
necessary to have a separate legitimate collaboration with University of 
North Carolina Medical School.55  In particular, the Department’s state-
ment of interest asserts: 
Just as an agreement between competitors to allocate customers 
eliminates competition for those customers, an agreement between 
them to allocate employees eliminates competition for those employ-
ees. As with other types of allocation agreements, an employee that 
is a victim of an allocation agreement between employers cannot 
reap the benefits of competition between those employers that may 
result in higher wages or better terms of employment. Furthermore, 
just as allocation agreements in product markets have almost identi-
cal anticompetitive effects to price-fixing agreements, no-poach 
agreement between competing employers have almost identical an-
ticompetitive effects to wage-fixing agreements: they enable the em-
ployers to avoid competitive overages and other terms of employ-
ment offered to the affected employees.56 
Therefore, the Department argued that the district court should find 
the schools’ no-poach arrangements to be illegal per se.57  The court 
agreed and rejected the defendant medical schools’ arguments that the 
general rule of reason should be the appropriate standard of antitrust re-
view and that their agreement between the schools was ancillary to a 
valid relationship and therefore not presumptively illegal.58  However, 
the court also rejected the medical schools’ arguments in their motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, and accepted the Department’s argu-
ment that: 
Duke also wrongly argues that the rule of reason must apply because 
the “schools collaborate and support each other” and a no-poach 
agreement could help prevent “free riding” on their investment in 
medical faculty. This is exactly the sort of argument the ancillary 
restraints doctrine is designed to address, but there are two 
 
 54. Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 2, Seaman v. Duke Univ., 
No. 1:15-cv-00462-CCE-JLW (M.D. N.C. Mar. 7, 2019) (No. 325). 
 55. See id. at 4-5. 
 56. Id. at 22 (internal citation omitted). The statement also argued that the defendants do 
not qualify under the Parker “state action” exception and thereby, do not have ipso facto im-
munity as a sovereign representative of the state. See id. at 6-13. 
 57. Id. at 23. 
 58. Order Granting the United States of America’s Unopposed Motion to Intervene, Sea-
man v. Duke Univ., No. 1:15-cv-00462-CCE-JLW (M.D.N.C. May 22, 2019) (No. 362), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1165006/download. 
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deficiencies in Duke’s showing. First, for a restraint to be ancillary, 
there must be a separate legitimate collaboration that it renders more 
effective. Duke has not identified any specific collaboration between 
it and UNCSM to which the no-poach agreement would have been 
ancillary. Second, to be ancillary, a restraint must be reasonably nec-
essary to achieve the benefits of the legitimate collaboration, but 
Duke cannot show that here while denying the restraint’s existence.59 
The Department also argued that the per se rule ought to apply un-
less Duke met its burden of providing evidence for finding that it had a 
substantial, justifiable reason for its actions to impose the no-hire agree-
ment and that reason was ancillary to some pro-competitive coopera-
tion.60   
3. Joseph Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc. 
Joseph Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc. involved the use of no-poach 
agreements in a fast food franchise setting where it was alleged that the 
no-poach provisions were imposed in franchisor-franchisee agreements 
and they prohibited franchisees from employing an employee of the fran-
chisor or another franchisee 61  The Department intervened and filed a 
Statement of Interest arguing that the rule of reason, and not the per se 
rule, should apply to the alleged no-poach agreement because franchisor-
franchisee agreements are predominantly vertical in nature and the an-
cillary restraint doctrine and the rule of reason should be applied.62  The 
Department also argued that these agreements do not form a hub and 
spoke conspiracy and therefore the per se rule cannot apply.63  The De-
partment also argued that the court should evaluate the no-poach agree-
ments under the ancillary restraint doctrine but that the court should not 
apply the quick-look form of analysis because the case arose in a fran-
chise setting.64 
 
 59. Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 28-29, Seaman v. Duke 
Univ., C.A. No. 1:15-cv00462-CCE-JLW (M.D. N.C. Mar. 7, 2019) (internal citations omit-
ted). 
 60. Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 5, 19, 24, Seaman v. Duke 
Univ., No. 1:15-cv-00462-CCE-JLW (M.D. N.C. Mar. 7, 2019) (No. 325). 
 61. Corrected Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 3-4, Joseph Stigar 
v. Dough Dough Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00244 (E.D. Wash.). 
 62. Corrected Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 11-12, Joseph 
Stigar v. Dough Dough Inc., et al., No. 2:18-cv-00244 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1141731/download [hereinafter U.S. Dough 
Dough Corrected Statement]. 
 63. See id. at 16-17. 
 64. Quick-look analysis under Section 1 of the Sherman Act is an intermediary form of 
analysis of restraints on competition, usually some type of restraint on price. It is used in 
situations where the court believes that the price restrictive conduct has some potential ame-
liorating aspects and, therefore, the rule of per se illegality should not be used. However, the 
court applying this analysis does not evaluate the procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive 
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The Department argued in the Statement that: 
In the franchise context, the typical no-hire or no-solicitation agree-
ment between a franchisor and a franchisee precludes the franchisee 
from hiring or soliciting other franchisees’ employees.  Such a typi-
cal restriction is a vertical allocation agreement “limiting the number 
of [employers] competing for …a given group of [employees],” and 
its anticompetitive effects… can be adequately policed under the rule 
of reason. 
Even though the typical no-poach agreement between a franchisor 
and one of its franchisees is vertical, it could be horizontal if it re-
strains competition between two interrelated entities.  Specifically, a 
franchisor and one of its franchisees may actually or potentially 
“compete in the market in which the relevant employees are hired.” 
If operating in the same geographic market, they both could look to 
the same labor pool to hire, for example, janitorial workers, account-
ants, or human resource professionals. In such circumstances, the 
franchisor is competing with its franchisee, “notwithstanding that 
they do not compete in the market in which their goods or services 
are sold.” If a complaint plausibly pleads direct competition between 
a franchisor and its franchisees to hire employees with similar skills, 
a no-poach agreement between them is correctly characterized as 
horizontal, and, if not ancillary to any legitimate procompetitive joint 
venture, would be per se unlawful.65 
The Department’s use of its Statement of Interest powers in these 
cases help shape the courts’ decisions on important antitrust issues in 
private party no-poach cases.  Without question, the several Statements 
of Interest in private cases have led to settlements and, more signifi-
cantly, better antitrust analysis by the federal courts in those cases.66  De-
spite these helpful steps, conceptual and practical ambiguities remain 
within the Department’s recommendations.  These ambiguities leave 
courts uncertain regarding the proper Section 1, Sherman Act analysis in 
cases involving employment related restraints.  The next section of this 
article takes up the debate. 
III. THE EFFICACY OF THE DEPARTMENT’S POSITIONS IN THE 
 
effects to the same extent as performed under the rule of reason. See Edward D. Cavanagh, 
What Happened to Quick Look?, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV 39, 55-56 (2017).   
 65. U.S. Dough Dough Corrected Statement, supra note 62, at 12-13 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 66. See, e.g., Danielle Seaman v. Duke University and Duke University Health System, 
ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/atr/case/danielle-seaman-v-duke-university-et-al (settling approximately 6 months 
after the Statement of Interest); U.S. Dough Dough Corrected Statement, supra note 62; State-
ment of Interest of the United States, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., No. 
2:18-mc-00798-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019) (No. 158). 
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STATEMENTS AND JUDICIAL RECEPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT’S 
ARGUMENTS 
This section continues the discussion of the Department’s argu-
ments and recommendations in its Statements and, more importantly, 
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of those positions.  It also de-
scribes the varying reactions of the courts in which the Statements were 
filed, although those private civil antitrust cases have either settled or are 
continuing, as revealed by opinions on motions to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a cause of action under the antitrust laws. 
A. The Department’s Enforcement Policy Articulated in its Statements 
of Interest 
The Department’s use of Statements of Interests in several no-
poach agreement cases, as discussed in the previous section, as well as 
public comments by Department leaders reveal that the Department ad-
vocates a traditional approach to both the characterization of the no-
poach restraints (i.e., either as a “naked” restraint or as vertical restraints 
that may demonstrate procompetitive attributes) and to the appropriate 
forms of antitrust analysis (i.e., either the per se rule approach or as one 
to be analyzed under the comprehensive rule of reason approach).67  The 
Department’s position is that a horizontal agreement to fix employee 
wages or not hire each other employees is a “naked” restraint of trade 
and lacks redeeming pro-competitive justifications and is therefore per 
se illegal.68  Further, the Department’s position is that for all other em-
ployment related restraints of trade, the appropriate form of antitrust 
analysis is the more comprehensive rule of reason analysis.69  Thus, the 
Department has chosen to consider no-poach agreements, in their pur-
pose and effect, to be like other forms of restraints that have been re-
viewed by the courts—such as customer or market allocations—and not 
as novel or a new form of commercial conduct that would require a 
threshold determination under the rule of reason or quick-look analysis 
 
 67. See supra Section I.B; see, e.g., Finch, supra note 41 (“Agreements between employ-
ers that eliminate competition for employees in the form of no-poach agreements are per se 
violations of the Sherman Act.”); Antitrust Guidance, supra note 31, at 3-4, 8; No-Poach Press 
Release, supra note 39 (describing the Department’s prosecution of and intervention in cases 
of naked no-poach agreements and its argument that such vertical restraints are subject to the 
per se rule). 
 68. See, e.g., No-Poach Press Release, supra note 39 (“[N]aked no-poach agreements 
between rival employers within a franchise system are subject to the per se rule.”). 
 69. See, e.g., id. (explaining that, unlike horizontal agreements, “[a] restriction in a fran-
chise agreement that forbids franchisees from poaching each other’s employees . . . is subject 
to the rule of reason in the absence of agreement among the franchisees because it is a vertical 
restraint.”). 
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to determine if it is mainly and usually anticompetitive.70  That position 
by the government seems sensible and appropriate but some of the courts 
that received Statements did perform a threshold evaluation of no-poach 
and no-hire agreement to determine what form of analysis should be ap-
plied.71  In particular, the district court in Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. 
v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., in an opinion on defendant’s motion to dismiss, 
performed a thoughtful characterization process on a hard-core no-poach 
provision in a collaboration agreement between competitors in the mar-
ket for travel nurses and associated tech personnel.72  The court’s ap-
proach is instructive for other courts evaluating Section 1 claims in cases 
involving no-poach, no-hire, non-solicitation and similar agreements or 
provisions within some other collaborative arrangement.73 
However, the Department has indicated that it will advocate for ap-
plication of the ancillary restraint doctrine in some types of no-poach 
and related restraint-on-employment cases rather than the more tradi-
tional reasonableness or per se illegal forms of analysis.74  Further, the 
Department has repeatedly rejected application of the “quick-look” anal-
ysis in all cases involving no-poach agreements.75  The next sections will 
discuss these positions by the Department and how the courts have re-
sponded to the Statements.   
 
 70. The Department has argued that no-poach and similar employment restraints agreed 
to be competitor-employers are substantially similar to customer allocation and market divi-
sion agreements and has stated that the Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) and Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) 
reiterated that such agreements are illegal per se. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United 
States of America at 20, Seaman v. Duke Univ., Civ. No. 1:15-cv-462 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 7, 
2019). 
 71. See, e.g., Aya Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., 2018 WL 3032552 
(S.D. Cal. June 19, 2018); In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., 395 F. Supp. 3d 
464 (W.D. Pa. 2019). 
 72. Aya Healthcare, 2018 WL 3032552, at *8-14 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2018). The restric-
tive provision was imposed by defendant’s agreements with subcontractors and software-plat-
form providers in the national market for traveling nurses and medical technicians who travel 
throughout the country to perform temporary assignments in understaffed hospitals. Plaintiff 
operates a competitive business and claimed to have a difficult time getting traveling nurses 
because of the defendant’s no-poach provisions in contracts with traveling nurse subcontrac-
tors and had entered into no hire agreements with competitors (like the plaintiff) whose busi-
nesses were to provide nurse subcontracts. The court described the no-poach provisions to 
“forbid the rival providers in perpetuity to initiate job offers or otherwise solicit any of [de-
fendant’s] designated ‘employees,’ no matter how or where employed, and even when not 
currently on assignment for [defendant].” Id. at *9. 
 73. The Aya Healthcare Services court’s analysis of the employment restrictions in that 
case are discussed later in the article. 
 74. See, e.g., No-Poach Press Release, supra note 39 (“If there is an alleged agreement 
among the franchisees, the restraint is subject to the rule of reason so long as it is ancillary; 
that is, separate from, and reasonably necessary to, the legitimate franchise collaboration.”). 
 75. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he ‘quick-look’ form of rule of reason analysis is inapplicable be-
cause the court should weigh the anticompetitive effects against the procompetitive benefits 
of franchise no-poach agreements that qualify as either vertical or ancillary restraints.”). 
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B. Rejection of “Quick-look” Analysis 
The “quick-look” form of Section 1, Sherman Act antitrust analysis 
has been somewhat controversial in recent years.  Indeed, the United 
States Supreme Court has used it or rejected it in at least three decisions 
and, therefore, it remains somewhat murky in terms of its appropriate 
use in restraint of trade cases.  Justice Souter rejected the court of ap-
peals’ use of the quick-look approach in California Dentists, a case in-
volving the FTC’s challenge to a dentists’ association limits on member 
price discounting and advertising.76  The Court reasoned that the quick-
look approach to anticompetitive conduct under Section 1 was not sen-
sitive enough to the justifications for the dentists’ restrictions on mem-
bers’ advertising.77  The majority opinion in California Dentists 
acknowledged that Supreme Court cases “have formed the basis for what 
has come to be called abbreviated or ‘quick-look’ analysis under the rule 
of reason, an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of eco-
nomics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an 
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”78  The Court also 
stated that “quicklook analysis carries the day when the great likelihood 
of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.”79 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Texaco Inc. v. Dagher,80 en-
dorsed the viability of the “quick-look” analysis in Section 1 cases: “To 
be sure, we have applied the quick-look doctrine to business activities 
that are so plainly anticompetitive that courts need undertake only a cur-
sory examination before imposing antitrust liability.”81  Despite the An-
titrust Division’s position that it should not be used by courts in no-poach 
cases, quick-look analysis remains a recognized analytic approach to 
Section 1 cases involving agreements to restrain trade.  There are two 
reasons that may explain why the government antitrust enforcement 
agency does not advocate for quick-look analysis in agreements to re-
strict employee compensation and job mobility.  First, it may reflect the 
notion that the Department does not believe that the approach has “stay 
power” and will not be more broadly adopted by the courts as a viable 
analytic approach to these restraints.  Second, the Department’s position 
may be due to its belief that there are aspects to the no-poach agreements 
that make “quick-look” inappropriate as a matter of antitrust analysis. 
 
 76. For a discussion of the application of the quick-look analysis in California Dentist 
case, see Cavanagh, supra note 64, at 54. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Com’n, 526 
U.S. 756, 759-64, 780-81 (1999). 
 77. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780-81. 
 78. Id. at 770. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 81. Id. at 7, n.3 (citing Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770.).   
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On the first possible reason, it is true that quick-look analysis has 
received little attention by trial courts and agencies, but several federal 
circuit courts of appeal have expressly approved the appropriate use of a 
quick-look approach in Section 1, Sherman cases.82  Since National So-
ciety of Professional Engineers, the Court has indicated that the tradi-
tional two-test approach—rule of reason or per se illegal—to restraints 
of trade may not be flexible and robust enough to permit courts to pre-
dictably sift through the matrix of industries, allegedly anticompetitive 
practices, and competitive implications of the accused practices, and that 
a broader set of possible analytic approaches is needed.83  The Depart-
ment’s position on prosecuting no-poach agreements strongly advocates 
for the use of the per se standard for “naked” restraints on price and the 
use of the rule of reason standard in all other cases involving no-poach 
agreements or employment restrictive practices.84  Thus, a fundamental 
issue in recommending, or not, the use of the “quick-look” analysis is 
whether the restraint in question is a practice so plainly anticompetitive 
that it is a good candidate for the quick-look approach.85  Alternatively, 
courts can consider whether there are procompetitive attributes of no-
poach and related restrictive practices on employees that a full blown 
rule of reason analysis is needed to ensure that some positive and pro-
competitive practices are not prematurely struck down by reason of the 
truncated analysis involved in the quick-look approach.   
At this point, it is helpful to canvas the categories of employment 
related restraints on trade (an antitrust law issue) and restraints on 
 
 82. See, e.g., In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 275 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Under 
the quick-look standard, the Plaintiffs have met their burden of raising a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Dean Foods violated the antitrust laws even without establishing 
the relevant geographic market.”); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 
1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (“We find it appropriate to adopt such a quick look rule of reason in 
this case. Under a quick look rule of reason analysis, anticompetitive effect is established, 
even without a determination of the relevant market.”). 
 83. Nat’l Soc. of Prof. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Indeed, Justice 
Souter speaking for the Court in the California Dental Association case quoted Professor 
Philip Areeda, the most significant antitrust scholar of modern times, to suggest both that the 
courts already use a non-binary Section 1 analysis and, even then, it is potentially misleading 
to suggest that great precision in weeding out clearly illegal restraints from ones that should 
be permitted. 526 U.S. at 780 (quoting Philip Areeda, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1507, p. 402 (1986): 
“There is always something of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness, but the sliding 
scale formula deceptively suggests greater precision than we can hope for….”). 
 84. See, e.g., Antitrust Guidance, supra note 31, at 3 (“Naked wage-fixing or no-poach-
ing agreements among employers, whether entered into directly or through a third-party in-
termediary, are per se illegal under the antitrust laws. That means that if the agreement is 
separate from or not reasonably necessary to a larger legitimate collaboration between the 
employers, the agreement is deemed illegal without any inquiry into its competitive effects.”); 
No-Poach Press Release, supra note 39 (opining that, in the franchise context, naked restraints 
are per se unlawful while vertical restraints are subject to the rule of reason). 
 85. See Texaco, 547 U.S. at 7, n.3. 
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employment mobility (an employment law issue) and evaluate their po-
tential for anti-competitive effects and any pro-competitive implications 
in use of those restraints.  If there are few pro-competitive, redeeming 
virtues to these restraints, then the quick-look analysis might, as Justice 
Souter pointed out, “carr[y] the day,” and the court, applying the ra-
tionale of Indiana Federation of Dentists, would conclude without ex-
tensive evaluation that the restraint should be struck down.86 
At one end of a spectrum of practices,87 that involve restraints on 
employees, are the limitations on competition after the sale of a business, 
including a merger or other acquisitive transaction.88  These agreements 
have long been held to be permissible as a matter of state law favoring 
transactions that permit individuals to sell their businesses and are the 
result of business equals—a buyer and seller—who agree to the terms of 
the sale, including consideration for a forbearance by the seller from re-
turning to the market and competing against the buyer.89   
 
 86. See Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770-71. 
 87. A treatise on employment law described this spectrum of employer-employee ar-
rangements that involve limitations on competition by the employee: 
     “A federal district court, applying California law which broadly proscribes non-compete 
agreements, identified five different types of contractual provisions that might implicate a 
violation of the prohibiting restrictive covenants and, potentially, a violation of antitrust law: 
(1)  An agreement between an employer and an employee in which the employee 
agrees not to work for a competitor of the employer for a certain period of time (a 
classic non-compete agreement). 
(2)  An agreement forbidding the solicitation of the employer’s customers by the 
employee for a certain period of time following termination of employment (a var-
iation of non-compete provision). 
(3)  An agreement between a business and its customer that provides services of its 
employees directly to a customer in which the customer agrees not to hire the busi-
ness’ employees (a type of “no hire” agreement in which the agreement is between 
a business and its customer but not the business’ employee). 
(4)  An agreement that restricts an employee or former employee from soliciting the 
employer’s other employees (such as by approaching them for the purpose of en-
couraging the employees to leave and work for a competitor). 
(5)  An agreement between an employee and employer stipulating that the employee 
will not merely refrain from soliciting the employer’s other employees but will not 
hire those fellow employees.” 
MARK BENNETT, DONALD POLDEN & HOWARD RUBIN, EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS: 
LAW & PRACTICE §11.03 [D][5], p. 31 (Wolters Kluwer 2019) (quoting from Thomas Weisel 
Partners LLC v. BNP Paribas, 2010 WL 546497 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2010)). 
 88. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 144 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
district court properly applied rule of reason to no-hire agreement because it was a covenant 
not to compete and therefore a legitimate ancillary restraint executed upon transfer of owners 
of a business by merger transaction). 
 89. See Philip T. von Mehren et al., The Enforceability of Non-Competition Covenants 
Incident to the Sale of a Business, VENABLE LLP (May 30, 2019), https://www.vena-
ble.com/insights/publications/2019/05/the-enforceability-of-non-competition-covenants (ex-
plaining that “in both New York and Delaware, courts distinguish between the law governing 
covenants not to compete when incident to the sale of a business, and the law governing non-
competition agreements arising solely out of employment”); see, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
2020] NO-POACH AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 599 
An intermediate category of restraints includes employer-imposed 
non-competition agreements whereby the employee, with consideration, 
paid for agreement to forego competing against his former employer.90  
At English common law, which was later borrowed in American com-
mon law courts, these restrictions on subsequent employment were con-
sidered beneficial if the employee received some compensation and the 
reach and scope of the restriction on competing against the former em-
ployer was reasonable in scope and duration.91  In the early days of the 
Sherman Act, the courts attempted to factor in this reasonableness stand-
ard into the then new antitrust laws.92  Indeed, the reasonableness stand-
ard in Section 1, Sherman Act cases had its origin in common law cases’ 
emphasis on enforcement of such agreements as long as they were rea-
sonable in scope (e.g., geographical or customer limitations).93  This in-
termediate list of restrictions on a former employee’s competitive post-
termination activities further included non-solicitation agreements (i.e., 
agreements prohibiting active recruitment of the employer’s other em-
ployees) and non-disclosure agreements (i.e., agreements prohibiting a 
former employee from disclosing the employer’s information and trade 
secrets).94   
At the other end of the spectrum are no-poach and no-hire agree-
ments entered into by competitors in markets for labor.  These are the 
Silicon Valley agreements.95  Notwithstanding the Justice Department’s 
failure to bring criminal action against the Silicon Valley companies, the 
Department’s position is that these are “naked” restraints identical to 
cartel price fixing agreements and they could be prosecuted criminally.96   
Antitrust analysis of some forms of employment related restraints 
on employees should proceed under the rule of reason where the types 
of restraint (for example, covenants not to compete) have been evaluated 
for reasonableness by state courts for a long time.  Further, evaluation of 
 
CODE § 16601 (West 2007) (excepting the sale of a business from California’s statute banning 
non-compete agreements). 
 90. See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, Employee Non-Competes and Consider-
ation: A Proposed Good Faith Standard for the “Afterthought” Agreement, 64 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 409, 423-27 (2015) (describing what constitutes sufficient consideration to forgo com-
petition among various states). 
 91. Melissa Ilyse Rassas, Explaining the Outlier: Oregon’s New Non-Compete Agree-
ment Law & the Broadcasting Industry, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 447, 448-50 (2009). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1987); United 
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 93. See Donald Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. 
REV. 759, 773 (1955); Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2293-99 (2013). 
 94. Thomas M. Hogan, Uncertainty in the Employment Context: Which Types of Restric-
tive Covenants Are Enforceable, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 429, 430 (2006). 
 95. See Ames, supra note 10. 
 96. See Antitrust Guidance, supra note 31, at 4. 
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these restraints on workers under the rule of reason is analytically sound 
because there are arguably pro-competitive justifications for their use 
and the per se and “quick-look” analyses would be too inflexible in con-
sidering those benefits and justifications.  However, no-poach and no-
hire agreements between competitors have few pro-competitive justifi-
cations and the per se rule, as argued by the Department, and the “quick-
look” analysis would be well suited to address these restraints on worker 
wages, benefits and mobility.97   
C. The Utility of the Ancillary Restraint Doctrine 
The Department’s position on no-poach claims also recommends 
analysis that utilizes the ancillary restraint doctrine, which essentially 
justifies a restraint on trade if it is ancillary to a legitimate transaction, 
even where the restraint is characterized as a per se, or naked, restraint.  
Relying on Judge Bork’s decision in Rothery Storage & Van Co., v. Atlas 
Van Lines, Inc.,98 the Department argued that: 
[i]f the facts show that no-poach agreements are reasonably neces-
sary to a separate, legitimate business transaction or collaboration 
among employers, they are not per se unlawful and would instead be 
judged under the rule of reason. Under the ‘ancillary restraint doc-
trine,’ an agreement ordinarily condemned as per se unlawful is ‘ex-
empt from the per se rule” if it is ancillary to a separate, legitimate 
venture between the competitors.99   
The Department Statement continues that “ ‘ [t]o be ancillary,’ an 
‘agreement eliminating competition must be subordinate and collateral 
to a separate, legitimate transaction,’ and reasonably necessary to ‘make 
the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its purpose.’ ”100  
According to the Antitrust Division,  the issue of “ancillarity”—whether 
or not the restraint occurred as a part of a transaction the primary purpose 
 
 97. Some courts addressing the Department’s contentions in Statements of Interest have 
reached a similar conclusion and stated that, upon completion of discovery, they may decide 
to declare that the per se or quick-look analysis would be applied to those restraints. See, e.g., 
Ry. Indus., 395 F. Supp. 3d at 481-82 (“The court’s decision that the agreements alleged by 
plaintiff are plausibly per se violations of the antitrust law is supported by the case law and 
the position of the DOJ, which was articulated by the government at the hearing on the motion 
to dismiss.”); Conrad v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, No. 3:18-cv-00133-NJR-RJD, 2019 WL 
2754864, at *1-2 (S.D. Ill. May 21, 2019) (explaining that the prior judge disagreed with the 
DOJ’s Statement of Interest and held that the quick look analysis could be applied to vertical 
restraints on trade for franchise agreements depending on the facts of the case); In re Papa 
John’s Emp. and Franchisee Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 3:18-CV-00825-JHM, 2019 WL 
5386484, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2019) (declining to announce a quick look or rule of reason 
analysis without further factual development). 
 98. 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 99. Statement of Interest of the United States at 10, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach 
Antitrust Litig., Civ. No. 2:18-MC-00798-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019). 
 100. Id. 
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of which is procompetitive, is fundamental to the ultimate decision to 
apply the per se or rule of reason, because  “there are two ways for a no-
poach agreement to be subject to the rule of reason and not the per se 
rule:  verticality and ancillarity.”101 
The Department’s position is thus that no-poach provisions or cov-
enants in franchise agreements must be reviewed under a rule of reason 
analysis where the relationship between the no poach provision and the 
franchise system is a vertical one and that the no poach restriction is 
necessary to make the franchise system work more efficiently in making 
the franchise system work.102  The verticality issue arises because of the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions rejecting the longstanding use of the 
rule of per se illegality in virtually all vertical relationships and instead 
requiring a full blown rule of reason analysis.103  However, in some fran-
chise relationships, the franchisor functions in a vertical relationship to 
its franchisees while also competing against them when it operates com-
pany owned stores.104  When this occurs, the restraint is horizontal and 
agreements between competitors (here, franchisor and franchisees or be-
tween franchisees) are therefore presumptively illegal.105  Further, in 
other situations the no-poach restraint may be imposed vertically, such 
as by a franchisor who does not maintain company offices and therefore 
does not compete with its franchisees in either the market for the fran-
chise branded product or in the market for the employees who produce 
the branded product.  In that situation, the no-poach restriction is im-
posed vertically by the franchisor but is implemented for the benefit of 
the franchisees who are in a horizontal relationship with each other in 
the market for the franchise branded product.  In these situations, either 
the restraint on trade is imposed by a horizontal agreement or the in-
tended impact of the restraint on trade is felt on a horizontal level.   
The difficulty with the Department’s analysis is the horizontal im-
plications of these no-poach agreements.  Are there clear pro-
 
 101. Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 13. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 2, 22 (1997). 
 104. See Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 12; Randy M. Stutz, Assoc. Gen. 
Counsel of the Am. Antitrust Inst., The Evolving Antitrust Treatment of Labor-Market Re-
straints: From Theory to Practice, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 18 (July 31, 2018), https://www.an-
titrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AAI-Labor-Antitrust-White-Paper_0-1.pdf 
[hereinafter Stutz, Evolving Antitrust]; see, e.g., Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, 
No. 2:18-cv-13207-VAR-DRG, 2019 WL 2247731, at *5 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019) (alleg-
ing that the defendants “orchestrated an agreement not to compete for labor among their fran-
chisees”). 
 105. See, e.g., Domino’s, 2019 WL 2247731, at *4-5 (finding that the plaintiff plausibly 
pled an alleged anticompetitive agreement in the franchise context was sufficiently unreason-
able under the per se rule and the quick-look analysis). 
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competitive benefits from these horizontal restrictions on workers’ mo-
bility, and with it the suppression of workers’ wages, or are these re-
straints largely devoid of competition-enhancing attributes?  The Court’s 
rejection of bright line rules in some vertical restraint cases has made it 
clear that an overriding reason for the application of the rule of reason is 
that the vertically-related parties have aligned interests in maximizing 
sales through cooperation and, to some degree, a subordination of their 
respective self-interests in order to achieve sales.106  However, in those 
cases the restraints occur in a single market, the intra-brand market, and 
not in two markets.107  In the context of franchise relationships, the fran-
chisees and franchisor have a common interest in the franchise product 
(e.g., hamburgers for fast food franchises) but that product is not fungi-
ble or interchangeable with the employees who make the burgers; the 
markets for hamburgers and employees are distinct.108  A Department 
official stated that “[f]rancisors and franchisees, of course, are primarily 
in a vertical relationship in their industry and generally not competitors 
with respect to the labor market.”109  However, the official stated that he 
is aware: 
[T]hat companies can be competitors in the labor market but not 
competitors in product or service markets. Companies in different 
industries can compete in the same market for employees. But if they 
are not competitors in the labor market but instead are, for example, 
vertically related in their industry, then any agreement among them 
is subject to the rule of reason.110 
A related concern is the Antitrust Division’s position on the ancil-
lary restraint doctrine’s applicability to franchise system restrictions on 
workers of franchisor and franchisees.  The Division has recommended 
that the doctrine be applied and the no-poach restraint analyzed under 
the rule of reason when it is collateral to the franchise arrangement and 
that it is necessary to make the franchise system work efficiently.111  The 
clear purpose and effect of both no-hire and no-poach agreements—
whether in the franchise context or in the independent or unrelated com-
petitor context—is to restrict employee mobility and compensation for 
purposes of reducing the employers’ costs by paying the employees less.  
While partial integration, such as by joint venture or creating a franchise 
 
 106. See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 877 (holding that “vertical price restraints are to be 
judged by the rule of reason.”). 
 107. See id. at 902-04; see also Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 11, 13. 
 108. See, e.g., Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 WL 3105955, 
at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (examining the relationship between noncompete agreement 
and pro-competitive benefits in the franchise context). 
 109. Murray, Justice’s Efforts, note 7, at 12.   
 110. Id. at 11. 
 111. Id. at 12. 
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system, may result in cost-reduction opportunities for the firm, the re-
duction in employee costs by franchisor-franchisee no-poach agree-
ments presents no benefits for the employees.   
It might be helpful to look at the justifications for no-poach (and 
similar) restrictions on employee mobility and wages and balance them 
against the obvious anticompetitive implications of these restrictions.  
No-poach agreements are an extreme form of non-compete provision in 
that they both constrain or outright limit employee mobility during em-
ployment with the employer or, more often, after the employee or em-
ployer terminate the employment.  It has been argued, and accepted by 
some courts and legislatures, that reasonable restrictions on worker mo-
bility are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets, confidential 
commercial information that the employee gained during employment, 
and to protect the employer’s investment in the employee such as, by 
training.112  However, the most significant difference between a non-
compete provision and no-poach and no-hire agreements is that the em-
ployee does not agree to the employer’s restriction on the employee’s 
mobility and wages; it is imposed by employers’ agreement.  In most 
non-compete agreements between employers and employees, the em-
ployee must receive sufficient consideration for the agreement to be 
valid under state contract laws; no-poach and no-hire agreements most 
often involve no compensation for the employee.113  Employers have 
several methods for restricting employees from wrongfully taking and 
using the employers’ trade secrets with subsequent employers, including 
the Uniform Trades Secrets Act, which has been adopted by nearly every 
state, and the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act.  There are also contrac-
tual methods by which employers can secure their confidential commer-
cial information and be reimbursed for the training and other investments 
they have taken in their employees that are short of outright restraints on 
worker mobility.114  With the availability of these much less restrictive 
measures to protect employers’ legitimate interests, antitrust challenges 
to employer imposed non-compete arrangements may be successful.   
The Department’s arguments that no-poach provisions in franchise 
agreements should be considered vertical restraints and analyzed under 
the rule of reason are similarly weakened by the absence of any 
 
 112. See Eric A. Posner, The Antitrust Challenge to Covenants Not to Compete in Em-
ployment Contracts 5 (Sept. 13, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3453433 [hereinafter Posner, Antitrust Challenge]. 
 113. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 90, at 424; Steven Massoni, Limits of Noncom-
pete, No-Poaching, and No-Hire Agreements, HR DAILY ADVISOR (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/2018/11/29/limits-of-noncompete-no-poaching-and-no-hire-
agreements%EF%BB%BF/. 
 114. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 90, at 422-23 (describing interests of employers 
and society in using non-compete agreements to protect trade secrets). 
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appreciable competitive benefits from the no-poach agreements between 
franchisees and the franchisor (when it also maintains stores that com-
pete for workers with its own franchisees).  There may be credible argu-
ments as to why vertically imposed price and non-price restraints have 
procompetitive benefits, but it is not possible to identify them in verti-
cally imposed restrictions on worker mobility.115  The franchisor, in 
those situations, is attempting to enhance its competitiveness on price in 
the inter-brand market for its product (e.g., hamburgers) by constraining 
inter-brand competition in a distinctly different market (e.g., workers 
who can make burgers) and thereby enables franchisees to eliminate 
competition in the market for workers.  The Court in Leegin Creative 
Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. considered a similar situation in the con-
text of a minimum resale price maintenance scheme and, in a confusing 
juxtaposition, said that the cartel arrangements between either a manu-
factures’ group or a group of competing retailers are per se illegal but 
“[t]o the extent a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices is 
entered up to facilitate either type of cartel, it, too would need to be held 
unlawful under the rule of reason.”116  It is surprising that the Court 
would relegate these forms of cartel agreements, irrespective of the 
source of “facilitation,” to the rule of reason analysis when the rule of 
per se illegality has been the longstanding analytic approach to agree-
ments among competitors to restrain price competition.117  This may 
very well be a highly appropriate situation for the “quick-look” rule of 
reason approach to determine if there are facially valid competitive ben-
efits to a franchisor’s efforts to eliminate worker wage competition at the 
franchisee level.   
A franchisor who uses no poach or no hire provisions in the fran-
chise arrangement precludes worker wage competition in a horizontal 
context (i.e., where the franchisor also competes intra-brand at the fran-
chisee level) or in a vertical context (i.e., where the franchisor agrees 
with franchisees to eliminate wage price competition at the franchisee 
 
 115. Sanjukta Paul, Fissuring and the Firm Exemption, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 71 
(2019), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4919&context=lcp 
(“There is, in any event, no credible argument for extending [Court’s decisions in GTE Sylva-
nia, Khan and Leegin] to labor-facing restraints imposed by franchisors upon franchisees. 
Franchisors do not hire out workers to franchisees. No propriety technology licensed by fran-
chisors to franchisees is implicated in those relationships. Yet the Department of Justice chose 
to file a brief in these pending cases effectively supporting franchisors’ position and suggest-
ing that no-poach agreements limiting mobility among some of the lowest-wage, more vul-
nerable workers have legally cognizable benefits.”). 
 116. 551 U.S. at 893. 
 117. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1980); Nat.’l 
Soc. Prof. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (agreements that are “plainly anticompetitive” and lack any 
redeeming competitive virtue are conclusively presumed illegal without further examination).   
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level).118  It is difficult to imagine justifications or evidence of pro-com-
petitive benefits from those restrictive policies in either the horizontal or 
the vertical context.119  But relegating them to a rule of reason analysis 
merely because the franchisor is in a vertical relationship to the impact 
of the wage fixing ignores the fact that the arrangements are plainly an-
ticompetitive in most settings.  The next section of this article describes 
how receptive courts have been to the Department’s arguments concern-
ing characterization and treatment of restrictions on worker wages and 
mobility. 
 
D. The Courts’ Evaluation of the Government’s Position on No-Poach 
Agreement Litigation 
Since the joint DOJ/FTC Guidance for Human Resources Profes-
sionals and, prior to that, the settlements in the Silicon Valley no-poach 
cases, there have been several cases brought for imposition of no-poach 
or no-hire agreements.  In the main, these are class action lawsuits 
brought against employers for their use of no-poach, non-solicitation, 
and no-hire restraints.  The cases have spanned several industries (fast 
food franchises120, railroad equipment121, tenure-track faculty positions 
at two prestigious universities’ medical schools122) and several of these 
cases have involved the Department’s use of their Statements of Interest 
to influence the judge on its resolution of key antitrust analysis.123  An 
important policy question asks how has the Department fared in advo-
cating for greater antitrust scrutiny of employment related practices and 
what does the judicial treatment of the Department’s arguments suggest 
about future judicial treatment of these restriction on worker compensa-
tion and mobility.   
The courts considering these antitrust issues have typically deferred 
to many of the Department’s views on these difficult antirust matters.  
Such deference is appropriate because the Antitrust Division has some 
of the nation’s best antitrust lawyers.  However, the courts have, in some 
instances, declined to follow all of the key arguments and recommenda-
tions that the government has advocated in its Statements and, instead, 
 
 118. See, e.g., McDonald’s, 2018 WL 3105955; Domino’s, 2019 WL 2247731; Jimmy 
John’s, 2019 WL 2754864; Papa John’s, 2019 WL 5386484. 
 119. See, e.g., McDonald’s, 2018 WL 3105955, at *8 (rejecting the defendants’ argument 
that no-hire agreements among franchises promote inter- or intra-brand competition). 
 120. See, e.g., id.; Domino’s, 2019 WL 2247731; Jimmy John’s, 2019 WL 2754864; Papa 
John’s, 2019 WL 5386484. 
 121. See Ry. Indus., 395 F. Supp. 3d at 464. 
 122. See Seaman, 2018 WL 671239. 
 123. See, e.g., Ry. Indus., 395 F. Supp. 3d at 485; Jimmy John’s, 2019 WL 2754864, at 
*2-3; Papa John’s, 2019 WL 5386484, at *5. 
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have referred to case law precedents in their circuit.124  This section 
briefly describes some of these recent holdings.  In nearly all of these 
reported decisions, it is important to note that most have been issued on 
motions to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) and do not involve decisions 
on the merits.125 
First, some of the federal district courts considering the legality of 
no-poach agreements have rejected the recommendations in the State-
ments because the Department is considered merely persuasive authority 
on the subject of antitrust law.  For example, in Conrad v. Jimmy John’s 
Franchise, LLC, the district court, in considering whether no hire re-
strictions are ancillary restraints and therefore subject to the rule of rea-
son, stated “[b]ut the Department is not the ultimate authority on the sub-
ject, especially in a situation like this one: after the Department 
submitted its Statement of Interest, the American Antitrust Institute—
another titan in the antitrust arena—penned a letter in staunch opposition 
to the DOJ.”126  Other courts have rejected the Department recommen-
dation that no-poach cases should not be evaluated under the “quick-
look” approach.  For example, in Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 
the court, considering a motion to dismiss, rejected the defendant’s ar-
gument that the quick-look analysis was inappropriate for use in cases 
involving no-poach agreements because many such agreements must be 
analyzed under the rule of reason.127  The court stated: 
[e]ven a person with a rudimentary understanding of economics 
would understand that if competitors agree not to hire each other’s 
employee, wages for employees will stagnate. Plaintiff herself expe-
rienced the stagnation of her wages. A supervisor for a competing 
McDonald’s restaurant told plaintiff she would like to hire plaintiff 
for a position that would be similar to plaintiff’s position but would 
pay $1.75-2.75 more per hour than she was earning. Unfortunately 
for plaintiff, the no-hire agreement prevented the [competing 
McDonald’s restaurant] from offering plaintiff the job.  When plain-
tiff asked her current employer to release her, plaintiff was told she 
 
 124. See Leah Nylen & Joshua Sisco, DOJ Weighs in on More Antitrust Cases with Mixed 
Success, MLEX MARKET INSIGHT (Oct. 1, 2019), https://mlexmarketinsight.com/insights-
center/editors- /antitrust/north-america/doj-weighs-in-on-more-antitrust-cases-with-mixed-
success; see, e.g., Jimmy John’s, 2019 WL 2754864, at *2-3 (comparing the DOJ’s and Amer-
ican Antitrust Institute’s positions on horizontal restraints in the franchise context); Papa 
John’s, 2019 WL 5386484, at *5 (taking judicial notice of the DOJ’s Statement of Interest but 
explaining that the court “will not . . . abdicate its duty to apply the law to the facts of this 
case by blindly deferring to the DOJ’s analysis of distinct factual scenarios.”). 
 125. See, e.g., McDonald’s, 2018 WL 3105955, at *3-4; Domino’s, 2019 WL 2247731, at 
*2; Papa John’s, 2019 WL 5386484, at *2; Ry. Indus., 395 F. Supp. 3d at 477-78; Seaman, 
2018 WL 671239. 
 126. 2019 WL 2754864 (refusing to grant franchisor’s motion to dismiss). 
 127. McDonald’s, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7. 
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was too valuable.  The Court agrees that an employee working for a 
below-market wage would be extremely valuable to her employer.128   
The courts considering no-poach agreements in franchise arrange-
ments have not unanimously embraced the ancillary restraint doctrine as 
recommended by the Department.  Some courts have reasoned that once 
discovery has been completed and the case is ready for trial, that would 
be the more appropriate time to evaluate the viability and applicability 
of an ancillary restraint allegation.129  Yet, in other cases, like Aya 
Healthcare Services, Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., the court, at the stage 
of considering motions to dismiss, stated that the plaintiffs had alleged a 
horizontal market allocation agreement and, therefore, without any evi-
dence of a reasonable and ancillary purpose for the subcontractors agree-
ments, the no poach agreements would be evaluated under the per se 
rule.130 
The lower court decisions have taken varying positions on the role 
of market power and market definition in these Section 1 cases.  As a 
general proposition, in a rule of reason case under Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act, the plaintiff has the burden of showing anticompetitive conduct 
in a properly defined market or, rather than engaging in economic line-
drawing in an effort to define the market, plaintiffs can show that the 
restraint had actual harm to competition, such as reduced output or 
higher prices. 
In evaluating the competitive impact of no-poach agreements, re-
cent decisions of lower courts have considered the area of the market 
harmed by no poach agreements.  While some courts have looked to the 
product or brand sold by market participants, most courts have acknowl-
edged that those cases involve competitive effects on the labor market.131  
But some courts have expressed concern about evidence of limitations 
on intra-brand competition between franchisees of the same product or 
services brand.132  This is an important distinction:  the courts that have 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. See, e.g., id. at *8 (“Though this Court has concluded that plaintiff has stated a claim 
for a restraint that might be unlawful under the quick-look analysis, the evidence at a later 
stage may not support it.”); Jimmy John’s, 2019 WL 2754864, at *3 (denying Jimmy John’s 
motion to dismiss a case alleging horizontal restraints of trade in the franchise context where 
“the method of antitrust analysis that should apply . . . will ultimately come down to the facts 
behind these no-poach agreements, the relative independence of Jimmy John’s franchisees, 
and more.”). 
 130. Aya Healthcare, 2018 WL 3032552, at *12. See also United States v. eBay, 968 F. 
Supp. 2d 1030, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 131. See e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 797 (S.D. Ill. 
2018) (“Although the franchisees are dealing in the same brand, they are still competitors, and 
anyone with a rudimentary understanding of economics would understand that the no-hire 
agreements have an anticompetitive effect on the labor market targeted by those firms.”). 
 132. See Ogden v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc., 393 F.Supp.3d 622, 637 (E.D. Mich. 
2019) (citing Williams v. Nevada, 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1033 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d sub. nom. 
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concluded that the antitrust focus should be on the competition for em-
ployees, rather than competition between products, arrived at the proper 
legal conclusion.133   
The Department’s Statements of Interest have had a positive impact 
on judicial decision-making in this relatively new and clearly evolving 
area of law.  In particular, the Statements have assisted courts in gaining 
a clear focus on the key issues of characterizing no-poach and similar 
restraints on competition in the market for workers, on the applicability 
of the ancillary restraint doctrine in cases involving franchisor-imposed 
restraints on worker mobility, and on the utility of the “quick-look” anal-
ysis to these restrictive practices.  They have provided useful insights 
into technical areas of antitrust analysis and policy involving buyers’ 
markets.  However, these Statements have not yet fully defined the 
broader context of when restrictive practices are permissible in the area 
of worker mobility and wage suppression.  No-poach and no-hire agree-
ments are two forms of restraints on competition in labor markets, along 
with covenants not to compete and non-solicitation agreements; and they 
share the common element that they restrict worker mobility but are 
sometimes accompanied by beneficial attributes.  The next section puts 
those clearly restrictive practices, which are subject to the reach of the 
antitrust laws, into the broader context of all forms of restraints on work-
ers and on competition for labor.   
IV. ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR MARKET RESTRICTIONS   
The government’s heightened interest in enforcement of the anti-
trust laws in markets for labor is a positive development for antitrust 
enforcement and the promotion of antitrust norms in the market for labor 
and workers, which has been neglected by antitrust.134  It is also a posi-
tive development for protections of worker mobility, wage growth, and 
employees’ career growth.  It is estimated that approximately 18% of 
 
William v. I.B. Fischer Nevada 999 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Under the rule of reason, an 
inquiry must be made as to whether the purpose and effect of the hiring agreement were anti-
competitive. The purpose the agreement is to prevent the franchises from hiring away each 
other’s management employees. This agreement does not bar competitors of [other brand fast 
food restaurants] from hiring away these managerial employees. It only prohibits movement 
between the various franchises and since they are not competitive with each other, the agree-
ment cannot be anti-competitive.”)). 
 133. See, e.g., McDonald’s, 2018 WL 3105955, at *8 (“This case, though, is not about 
competition for the sale of hamburgers to consumers. It is about competition for employees, 
and, in the market for employees, the McDonald’s franchisees and the McOpCos within a 
locale are direct, horizontal, competitors.”). 
 134. See generally Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for 
Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536 (2018) [hereinafter Antitrust Remedies]; 
Marinescu & Posner, supra note 34; Paul, supra note 115, at 65; Stutz, Evolving Antitrust, 
supra note 104. 
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employees in the U.S. workforce are currently subject to restraints on 
their mobility, wages and job growth prospects.135  Although antitrust 
law and policy have frequently been implicated in cases involving re-
straints on employees or on employment,136 this has not been an easy fit 
from an antitrust perspective.  There are several reasons for this uneasy 
fit: First, markets for labor are commonly thought of as monopsony mar-
kets because the buyer—employer—has considerably greater power 
than the sellers—workers.137  Antitrust has considerable experience with 
monopoly markets and the problems of monopoly—e.g., restricted out-
put, higher prices charged to consumers, economic inefficiency, and so-
cial loss—but less experience in monopsony markets.138  However, it has 
become increasingly evident that vigorous antitrust enforcement in mo-
nopsony labor markets is necessary to address the problems of sup-
pressed job opportunities, suppressed worker salaries, and collateral 
market effects of widespread use of restraints on labor.139 
Second, in recent years there has been much greater interest in the 
true economic and social effects of the many forms of constraints on 
worker mobility and salary opportunities.  The focus on the monopsony 
effects in markets for labor is a much more recently studied aspect of 
labor economics and antitrust policy.  The conclusions are that the high 
percentage of U.S. workers who are subject to agreements and covenants 
restricting their employment opportunities are contributing to slow wage 
growth and rising inequality.140  For example, recent studies have 
 
 135. See Labor Market Monopsony: Trends, Consequences and Policy Responses, 
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF 8 (Oct. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20161025_monopsony_labor_mrkt_cea.pdf [herein-
after White House Council]; Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, Nomcompetes in the 
U.S. Labor Force, U. MICH. L. & ECON. RES. 2-3, 12 (2019) (finding that 18.1% of current 
workers work under a non-compete restraint and that 38.1% of workers has worked under a 
non-compete provision at some time in their work history.). 
 136. See Murray, Justice’s Efforts, supra note 7, at 6-9. 
 137. White House Council, supra note 135, at 2-5. 
 138. See Suresh Naidu & Eric Posner, Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law 2-4 
(Jan. 13, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365374 [hereinafter 
Labor Monopsony] (Monopsony in labor markets is caused by the high concentration in those 
markets, the high costs of employees switching careers or jobs, and job differentiation, mean-
ing that “employers with monopsony power, whatever its source, can suppress wages (and 
degrade working conditions) in order to save labor costs.”); Marinescu & Posner, supra note 
34, at 6.   
 139. Antitrust Remedies, supra note 134, at 596 (“If a labor market monopsonist uses 
noncompetes, it can deter other firms from entering the labor market and offering superior 
wages and working conditions to workers…This calls for antitrust analysis rather than com-
mon law analysis.”). 
 140. See Labor Monopsony, supra note 138, at 2-3. 
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demonstrated that worker wages are 4%-5% higher in states that do not 
recognize or enforce worker non-compete restraints.141   
Most states permit employers to impose non-compete agreements 
that are intended to constrain job opportunities for employees but, as the 
courts in states that enforce such restrictions have found, the employer 
receives more substantial benefits from the imposition of the restraints 
compared to the employees.142  However, in recent years, two significant 
things have changed:  First, state legislatures have begun to more care-
fully examine those restraints and are putting more stringent limits on 
the scope and enforceability of these covenants.143  For example, recent 
legislation in some states have prohibited the use of non-compete agree-
ments to minimum wage employees who have limited job opportunities 
and changing jobs is often the only way to improve those workers’ wages 
and salary.144  Second, the DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidance states that anti-
competitive behavior can be inferred from the circumstances even with-
out an explicit agreement among conspirators.145  An industry practice 
of imposing restrictive post-employment covenants and provisions may 
be evidence of an anticompetitive purpose or used to demonstrate an an-
ticompetitive effect in antitrust litigation concerning restraints of trade 
or monopolization in employment markets.146  Robust competition in 
markets for labor, the very thing that many no-poach and non-compete 
agreements are intended to constrain, increases the likelihood that 
worker wages do not stagnate and that there are real opportunities for 
workers to improve their living conditions and work opportunities.147   
 
 141. Evan Starr, Consider This: Training, Wages and the Enforceability of Covenants Not 
to Compete, 72 INDUS. & LAB. REV. 783, 799 (2019); Natarajan Balasubramanian, et al., 
Locked In? The Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and the Careers of High-Tech 
Workers 4 (U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. of Econ. Studies, Paper No. CES-WP-17-09, 2018). 
 142. See Posner, Antitrust Challenge, supra note 112, at 10-19 (evaluating arguments fa-
voring enforcement of covenants restricting competition and those that are costs to employees, 
other employers and other third parties incurred due to use of such restrictive practice). The 
author concludes that “the new evidence, along with the new research about labor market 
concentration, the evidence of wage stagnation, and the legacy of failed antitrust enforce-
ment—all of this suggests that the courts have failed to give noncompetes sufficient scrutiny.” 
Id. at 27. 
 143. Posner, Antitrust Challenge, supra note 112, at 2. 
 144. See id. at 8-9. 
 145. Antitrust Guidance, supra note 31, at 4-5.   
 146. Jeffrey S. Boxer & Alexander G. Malyshev, The Dangers of Using Illegitimate 
Means to Protect a Legitimate Interest: When Restrictive Covenants and Antitrust Laws Col-
lide, CARTER LEDYARD & MILBURN LLP (May 2, 2019), https://www.clm.com/publica-
tion.cfm?ID=5653. 
 147. See Posner, Antitrust Challenge, supra note 112, at 20-21; see also Naidu, Posner & 
Weyl, supra note 134, at 560-69; Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu & Marshall Steinbaum, Labor 
Market Concentration (Dec. 10, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3088767. 
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Third, yet another explanation for lagging antitrust and other eco-
nomic protections for workers is that unions, which were aggressive in 
affording protections to workers’ salaries and job opportunities, have 
been declining greatly in the last few decades.148  The unions were con-
sidered to be an important answer to systematic protection of worker in-
terests in dealings with employers on wages, benefits and workplace 
conditions.149  Today, a great deal of the U.S. workforce is not repre-
sented by collective bargaining groups or agreements and some pro-la-
bor groups are advocating for greater antitrust protections, including en-
forcement by the government, for workers.150 
Fourth, misguided interpretations of the “consumer welfare” stand-
ard in antitrust law and policy have dissuaded more rigorous enforce-
ment of antitrust laws in labor markets.  Basically, this standard provides 
a goal for antitrust law under the Sherman Act and it is one that protects 
the beneficial effects of competition which are enjoyed by ultimate con-
sumers, intermediate purchasers and suppliers, and others.151  The argu-
ment that national competition policy represented by the antitrust laws 
is advanced by powerful buyers (i.e., employers) suppressing the cost of 
labor in order to lower prices to consumers is bereft of intellectual co-
herence and fidelity to the true goals of U.S. antitrust law because mo-
nopsony power in labor markets is often the result of high concentration 
in those markets and this increases the opportunities for uncompetitive 
practices.152 
Finally, the fit between current antitrust law and labor policy favor-
ing worker mobility and wage competitiveness is also complicated be-
cause of antitrust analytic requirements which present problems in liti-
gating such cases.  For example, one major problem in Section 1, 
Sherman Act labor market cases is defining relevant markets and meas-
uring the effects of restraints on workers as may be required in a rule of 
reason analysis.  There are several reasons for this challenge. Geographic 
markets for workers tend to be highly local as most workers cannot 
 
 148. See Antitrust Remedies, supra note 134, at 542-43. 
 149. See Antitrust Remedies, supra note 134, at 542 (“Labor law protected workers who 
sought to form unions to combat the market power of employers. The theory was that if work-
ers banded together, they could use legally mandated collective bargaining and the threat of 
strikes to prevent employers from paying them monopsony wages.”). 
 150. See Alan B. Krueger & Eric A. Posner, A Proposal for Protecting Low-Income Work-
ers from Monopsony and Collusion, THE HAMILTON PROJECT 6-7, 12-13 (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_mo-
nopsony_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf. 
 151. Stutz, Evolving Antitrust, supra note 104, at 4-5. See also Barak Orbach, How Anti-
trust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2254-56 (2013); John B. Kirkwood & Robert 
H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Effi-
ciency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 197-201 (2008). 
 152. See Stutz, Evolving Antitrust, supra note 104, at 4-5.   
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realistically move freely to follow jobs, especially with low wage jobs 
such as fast food preparation and service.  Because many types of em-
ployment are catalogued by complex job descriptions and classifica-
tions, determining which workers are in the relevant market and which 
are not is difficult especially in cases brought as class actions.153  An 
added complexity is the recent decision in Ohio v. American Express Co. 
in which the Court held that plaintiffs who allege restraint in a vertical 
agreement must define the relevant market in which competition is al-
legedly restrained as an element of their case.154  While the reach and 
exact meaning of the Court’s language in that footnote is not clear, it 
does seem likely that plaintiffs (including the government) in no-poach 
(and similar worker restraint conspiracy) cases may be required to more 
clearly delineate the market(s) where the restraints harmed competition 
for workers. This will present a complication for efforts to prosecute re-
straints on worker markets. 
It is equally important to note, as discussed in earlier parts of this 
article, that antitrust law has been successfully applied to a variety of 
restraints in markets for labor.  So, notwithstanding the foregoing com-
plexities and difficulties, the antitrust laws remain an important instru-
ment in government and private party efforts to foster competition for 
workers and their wages and job mobility in those markets.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Strong antitrust enforcement in labor markets fosters the growth of 
competition for workers and thus increases workers’ access to new jobs, 
higher paying jobs, and more career opportunities.  The Silicon Valley 
no-poach cases were a major catalyst to the Justice Department’s current 
emphasis on promoting antitrust enforcement and protections in labor 
markets by putting a spotlight on patently anticompetitive conduct by 
major tech company CEOs.  In response, the nation has seen a major 
commitment by the Justice Department Antitrust Division’s to more vig-
orously enforce the Sherman Act in labor markets.  The enforcement to 
date has been insufficient, however.  “Fit” problems remain due to the 
sparse record of antitrust enforcement in labor-facing and monopsony 
markets.  In addition, the government’s enforcement initiatives face 
 
 153. For example, in Ry. Indus., 395 F. Supp. 3d at 474-75, the court correctly concluded 
that the no-poach agreement restraints occurred in the market for lateral hires (experienced 
and trained employees) and described how recruiting, training and retaining such employees 
would normally result in higher wages as the group of employers competed for the pool of 
employees services. The court also noted that this competition had the effect of raising wages 
in collateral or related categories of workers and therefore wages increased across many cat-
egories of workers in those competing firms. The companies’ responses include no poach 
agreements.   
 154. 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7. 
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challenges because of certain analytic requirements of the rule of reason 
analysis and because of some uncertainty about the applicability of the 
ancillary restraint doctrine to cases of  restraints on worker competition.  
Courts should steer away from application of the rule of reason in cases 
involving no-poach and similar highly restrictive covenants or agree-
ments because such analysis produces greater uncertainty for resulting 
litigation.155  In contrast, the clarity enabled by judicial application of the 
per se and quick-look forms of analysis in Section 1, Sherman Act cases 
can prevent the most egregious forms of cartel wage suppression such as 
no-poach and no-hire agreements by providing clear guidance to corpo-
rations. 
The stakes are high in employment and labor markets and the Jus-
tice Department rightly focuses its attention on ensuring that those mar-
kets are competitive, worker wages do not stagnate, and employers act 
fairly within the rules of competition law.  While federal antitrust en-
forcement agencies and courts must refine antitrust analysis to meaning-
fully regulate anticompetitive conduct in labor markets, states also have 
a role to play.  States must re-examine and improve their laws and poli-
cies concerning other forms of restrictive practices such as covenants not 
to compete and non-solicitation agreements.  If the states and antitrust 
enforcement agencies cannot effectively police employer policies to re-
strict competition by and between employees, then Congress must enact 
national legislation to protect workers by ensuring fair competition in 
labor markets.   
 
 
 155. The Court’s recent decision in Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct at 2284-2286 n.7, 
suggests that trying a case involving a restraint on worker wages or mobility that is classified 
as a rule of reason case will become more difficult to plead and prove. Rule of reason cases 
are difficult to succeed in because of the uncertainty of pleading and proof requirements as 
well as the considerable expense of trying a case involving proof of defendants’ market power. 
Professor Michael Carrier examined outcomes in rule of reason cases and concluded that de-
fendants won 221 out of 222 rule of reason cases that reached final judgment from 1999-2009. 
Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 827, 829-30 (2009). This seeming propensity for the government and some 
courts to avoid the “quick-look” and per se illegal analysis to no-poach, no-hire and similar 
restrictive practices in labor markets portends inadequate enforcement of the antitrust laws to 
those types of restrictive conduct. 
